Machine Reasoning to Assess Pandemics Risks: Case of USS Theodore
  Roosevelt by Lai, Kenneth & Yanushkevich, Svetlana N.
Machine Reasoning to Assess Pandemics Risks:
Case of USS Theodore Roosevelt
Kenneth Lai and Svetlana N. Yanushkevich
Biometric Technologies Laboratory, ECE Department, University of Calgary, Canada
http://www.ucalgary.ca/btlab, {kelai,syanshk}@ucalgary.ca
Abstract—Assessment of risks of pandemics to communities
and workplaces requires an intelligent decision support system
(DSS). The core of such DSS must be based on machine reasoning
techniques such as inference and shall be capable of estimating
risks and biases in decision making. In this paper, we use
a causal network to make Bayesian inference on COVID-19
data, in particular, assess risks such as infection rate and other
precaution indicators. Unlike other statistical models, a Bayesian
causal network combines various sources of data through joint
distribution, and better reflects the uncertainty of the available
data. We provide an example using the case of the COVID-19
outbreak that happened on board of USS Theodore Roosevelt in
early 2020.
Keywords: Risk, pandemics, epidemiological surveillance,
decision support, machine reasoning, Bayesian causal network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Epidemiological Surveillance (ES) uses various models to
forecast the spread of infectious disease in real-time. The
ES models can predict the pandemic’s mortality, but they
do not account for uncertainties such as reliability of testing
technology, specific environmental and social factors. In the
context of preparedness for future pandemics, they also do
not account for “the availability of treatment, clinical support,
and vaccines” [1].
Some ES models can be “stratified” for age, gender, or other
variables, but do not provide any causal analysis of those and
the risks of interest that must be assessed by the preparedness
decision-makers. In other words, they are not presented in
the form that enables its use in pandemics analysis, including
sensitivity analysis and model explainability.
COVID-19 outbreak provided valuable lessons and unveiled
critical disadvantages of the existing ES models including the
following:
1) The ES model’s outcomes need to be further translated
to become usable for human decision-makers. There is
a technology gap between the existing models and the
decision-making process, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
2) This can be implemented using computational intelli-
gence (CI) support in the decision-making process.
3) The CI tool needs to be based on causal models that
account for uncertainties, as well as perform fusion and
forecasting on those uncertainties.
The answers to the above challenges lie in the usage of
machine reasoning, namely, causal models such as causal
Bayesian networks. These causal models operate using prob-
abilities, thus accounting for uncertainties, and enable knowl-
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Fig. 1. The technology gap between modern ES and human decision-making:
the result of the epidemic/pandemic modeling is provided directly to human
experts. This output does not usually include the results of new knowledge
inference, or reasoning, to help experts to cope with the abundance of data
and uncertainty.
edge inference based on priors and evidence [2]. This approach
has been applied to risk assessment in multiple areas of
engineering and business [3], risk profiling in identity man-
agement [4], [5], medical diagnostics [6], and very recently to
the analysis of COVID-19 risks such as fatality and disease
prevalence rates [7].
The causal models shall be the core component of the
Decision Support System (DSS) that would support human-
decision makes in assessing the risk of the infectious disease
outbreaks.
The DSS concept was once known as an “expert system”
that provides certain automation of reasoning (though mainly
based on deterministic rules rather than Bayesian approach)
and interpretation strategies to extend experts’ abilities to ap-
ply their strategies efficiently [8]. Examples of contemporary
DSS are personal health monitoring systems [9], e-coaching
for health [10], security checkpoints [11], [12], and multi-
factor authentication systems [13].
This paper focuses on developing a DSS for ES, with a CI
core based on causal Bayesian networks. We define a DSS as
a crucial bridging component to be integrated into the existing
ES systems in order to provide situational awareness and help
handle the outbreaks better.
This paper is organized as follows. Contributions are listed
in Section II. Definitions of the relevant concepts are given
in Section III. The DSS concept and the fundamental risk
assessment operations are described in Section IV. An ex-
ample of reasoning on a causal network for the case of the
USS Theodore Roosevelt is shown in Section V. Section VI
concludes the paper.
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Fig. 2. The overall architecture for the proposed decision support system.
We focus on a specific case scenario of COVID-19 on the USS Theodore
Roosevelt. Therefore, the team leader, captain of the ship, is given recom-
mendations by both the medical officer and the support system.
II. CONTRIBUTION
Fig. 2 illustrates the general framework for the proposed
Decision Support System (DSS). In this paper, we illustrate
the idea of using machine reasoning to assist the team leaders
in making decisions by recommending the best course of
action given evidence. Using the USS Theodore Roosevelt as
a case study, we explore how different preventive behaviors
or measures, such as wearing face masks, impact the chance
of subjects being infected with COVID-19. Since all data re-
garding this case study is obtained after the fact, all reasoning
is based on evidence (reactive) and not proactive. It stands
to reason that when using these data as well as the fusion
of various current and past heterogeneous variables, we can
accumulate new knowledge for predicting the impact of future
outbreaks, and help prepare for those.
In this study, we identify a technological gap in the ES in
both technical and conceptual domains (Fig. 1). Conceptually,
the ES users require significant cognitive support using the CI
tools. This paper addresses the key research question: How
to bridge this gap using the DSS concept? We follow
a well-identified trend in academic discussion on the future
generation DSS [14].
This paper make further steps and contributes to the practice
of technology gap bridging. The key contribution is twofold:
1) Development of a reasoning and prediction mecha-
nism, the core of a DSS; for this, a concept of a
Bayesian causal network [15] is used; in particular, a
recent real-world scenario of COVID-19 was described
using a Bayesian network [7].
2) Development of the complete spectrum of the risk and
bias measures, including ES taxonomy updating.
These results are coherent with the solutions to the following
related problems:
− The technology gap “pillars” in Fig. 1 are the Protocol
of the ES model and the Protocol of the DSS. These
protocols are different, e.g. spread virus behavior and
conditions of small business operation. The task is to
convert the ES protocol into a DSS specification. Criteria
of efficiency of conversion are an acceptance of a given
field expert. The reasoning mechanism based on the
causal network intrinsically contains the protocol
conversion. We demonstrate this phenomenon in our
experiments.
− The DSS supports an expert to make decisions under
uncertainty in a specific field of expertise. Specifically,
intelligent computations help an expert in better inter-
pretation of uncertainty under chosen precautions. The
risk and bias are used in this paper as a precaution
of different kinds of uncertainties related to ES data
[16], testing tools, human factors, ES model turning
parameters, and artificial intelligence.
A DSS concept suitable for the ES model is proposed in this
paper.
III. BACKGROUND
In our study, we model the DSS as a complex multi-state
dynamic system [12]. A cognitive DSS is a semi-automated
system, which deploys CI to process the data sources and to
assess risks and other “precaution” measures such as trust
in the CI and various biases influencing the decision [5].
The crucial idea of our approach is that the risk assessment
should be performed using the reasoning mechanism [2]. This
assessment is submitted to a human operator for the final
decision.
IV. CORE SUPPORT SYSTEM
The core of the proposed DSS is a causal network that
allows us to perform reasoning. The reasoning operations are
defined as follows:
1) Prior data representations and assessments, such as
statistics and distribution of data after an outbreak that has
already happened, as well as the pre-existing conditions. In
causal modeling, the priors are represented by a corresponding
probability distribution function [2].
2) Causal analysis is based on the “cause-effect” paradigm
[15]. Another advanced tool is Granger causality analysis,
usually used to analyze time series and to determine whether
one can forecast the other [17].
3) Reasoning is the ability to form an intelligent conclusion
or judgment using the evidence. Causal reasoning is a judg-
ment under uncertainty performed on a causal network [15].
4) Prediction. In complex systems, meta-learning and meta-
analysis are be used to predict the overall success or failure of
the predictor. The most valuable information is in the “tails”
of the probabilistic distributions [18], [19].
A. Causal network
A causal network is a directed acyclic graph where each
node denotes a unique random variable. A directed edge from
node X1 to node X2 indicates that the value of X1 has a
direct causal influence on the value of X2. Uncertainty in
causal networks is represented as Conditional Uncertainty
Tables (CUTs). A CUT is assigned to each node in the causal
network, and it is a table that is indexed by all possible value
assignments to the parents of this node. Thus, each entry of
the CUT is a model of a conditional “uncertainty” that varies
according to the choice of the uncertainty metric.
A recent review [20] describes the various types of causal
networks that are deployed in machine reasoning:
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• Bayesian [2],
• Imprecise [21],
• Interval [22],
• Credal [23],
• DS [24],
• Fuzzy [25],
• Subjective [26].
The type of a causal network can be chosen given the DSS
model and a specific scenario. The choice depends on the
CUT as a carrier of primary knowledge and as appropriate
to the scenario. Various causal computational platforms for
modeling several systems were compared, in particular, in [27]
(Dempster-Shafer vs. credal networks), and [4], [5] (Bayesian
vs. interval vs. Dempster-Shafer vs. fuzzy networks).
B. Bayesian causal network
In our study, we use Bayesian causal networks, often simply
called Bayesian networks. Our motivation for choosing this
type of causal networks is driven by the fact that the Bayesian
(probabilistic) interpretation of uncertainty provides acceptable
reliability for decision-making.
The Bayesian decision-making is based on evaluation of a
prior probability given a posterior probability and likelihood
(event happening given some history of previous events).
Prior︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (Hypothesis|Data) =
Likelihood︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (Data|Hypothesis)×
Posterior︷ ︸︸ ︷
P (Hypothesis)
In a Bayesian network, the nodes of a graph represent
random variables X = {X1, . . . , Xm} and the edges between
the nodes represent direct causal dependencies. To construct a
Bayesian network, factoring techniques are generally applied.
Thus, this network is based on a factored representation of
joint probability distribution:
P (X) =
Factorization︷ ︸︸ ︷
m∏
i=1
P (Xi|
Nodes︷ ︸︸ ︷
Par(Xi)) (1)
where Par(Xi) denotes a set of parent nodes of the random
variable Xi. The nodes outside Par(Xi) are conditionally
independent of Xi.
The posterior probability of X1 is called a belief for
X1, Bel(X1), and the probability P (X1|X2) is called the
likelihood of X1 given X2 and is denoted L(X1|X2).
While the Bayesian network structure reflects the causal
relationships, its probability reflects the strengths of the rela-
tionships.
C. Risk Assessment
Risk and other “precaution” measures such as bias and trust
are often used to evaluate a cognition-related performance in
cognitive decision support systems [14].
The risk and trust measures are used in ES in simple
forms such as ‘high-risk group’, ‘risk factor’, and ‘systematic
difference in the enrollment of participants’ [16]. However,
the cognitive DSS is expected to provide the experts with
detailed assessments of epidemic scenarios and make the deci-
sion process more transparent and explainable. For example,
syndrome surveillance consists of real-time indicators for a
disease allowing for early detection [16].
The experts seek the DSS support in answering the follow-
ing questions:
• What are the risks given the state of the disease outbreak
and the health care resources?
• How reliable are the surveyed or collected data?
• What kind of biases are present or expected in data
collection, algorithms, and CI decision making?
Below, we provide a definition of risk by the US’ National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [28].
Definition 1: Risk is a measure of the extent to which an
entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and
typically is a function of: (i) the adverse impact, also called
cost or magnitude of harm, that would arise if the circumstance
or event occurs, and (ii) the likelihood of event occurrence.
For example, in automated decision making, and in our study,
the Risk is defined as a function F of Impact (also known
as Cost), I , of a circumstance or event and its occurrence
probability, P :
Risk = F (I, P) (2)
In other words, risk of event represents its impact provided
given the likelihood of the decision error.
The other “precaution” measures often used in causal mod-
els include bias and trust to the CI recommendations [14].
Definition 2: Bias in the ES refers to the tendency of an
assessment process to systematically over- or under-estimate
the value of a population parameter.
For example, in the context of detecting or testing for infec-
tious disease, the bias is related to the sampling approaches
(e.g. tests are performed on a proportion of cases only), sam-
pling methodology (systemic/random or ad-hoc), and chosen
testing procedures or devices [29]. The biases are probabilistic
in nature because the evidence and information gathered to
make a decision is incomplete, inconclusive, ambiguous, con-
flicting, and has various degrees of believability. Identifying
and mitigating bias is essential for assessing decision risks and
CI biases [14], [30], [31].
Acceptance of the cognitive DSS technology by human
decision-makers is determined by the combination of the bias,
trust, and risk factors [32], [33]. Other contributing factors
include belief, confidence, experience, certainty, reliability,
availability, competence, credibility, completeness, and co-
operation [34], [35]. In our approach, the causal inference
platform calculates various uncertainty measures [4] in risk
and bias assessment scenarios.
D. Reasoning for infection outbreak and impact prediction
Probabilistic reasoning on causal (Bayesian) networks en-
ables knowledge inference based on priors and evidence
has been applied to diagnostics for precision medicine [6].
Recently, COVID-19 risks analysis was performed by [7]: the
Bayesian inference was applied to learn the proportion of the
population with or without symptoms from observations of
those tested along with observations about testing accuracy.
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V. THE CAUSAL MODEL FOR USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT
SHIP
During the time of deployment of the USS Theodore
Roosevelt Ship around mid-January, an outbreak of COVID-
19 occurred that affected marines (younger healthy adults).
Approximately 1000 of the 1417 service members were deter-
mined to be infected with COVID-19. An investigation during
April 20-24, conducted by US Navy and CDC, includes a
study on 382 voluntary service members [36].
In our study, we created a fragment of a causal network
based on the available data (Figure 3). The risks assessed in
the DSS using the causal network include the ‘Infection Rate’,
False Positive Rate (FPR), False Negative Rates (FNR). We
define the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order knowledge as the prior,
calculated, and inferred knowledge, respectively.
A. Data Collection & Preparation
The causal network for this example is a Bayesian network
(BN), with Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) assigned to
the nodes. The CPTs were constructed using the data retrieved
from [36].
Given the reported test results based on two types, enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) and real-time reverse
transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR), error rates
such as FPR and FNR can be estimated. The designed BN
includes a ‘Test node representing the results of ELISA and
the previous RT-PCR test results. Using these results, FNR
and FPR are computed as follows:
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
, FNR =
FN
FN + TP
(3)
where True Negative (TN ) represents a healthy subject re-
ported (by testing) as healthy, True Positive (TP ) represents
an infected subject reported (by testing) as infected, False
Positive (FP ) represents a healthy subject reported (by testing)
as infected, and False Negative (FN ) represents an infected
subject reported (by testing) as healthy.
In this paper, we measure the ‘Infection Rate’, defined as
the ratio between the number of infections and the amount of
population at risk:
Infection Rate = K × number of infections
Population
(4)
where K is a constant value which we set to be 100 in order
for the Infection Rate value to be within the interval 0 to 100.
Table I shows all the nodes in the BN and their corresponding
states and probabilities. The probabilities for the prior nodes
in Table I are captured based on the statistics collected in
[36]. For example, in [36] there is a total of 382 volunteers,
of which 351 volunteers reported washing their hands as a
prevention measure. This results in the probabilities of 8.12%
(31/382) of volunteers who were not washing their hands, and
91.88% (351/382) of those washing their hands. In this paper,
we assume a uniform distribution for the node ‘Infection
Rate’ as no value was given in [36]. It should be noted
that this value is approximately 70% (1000/1417) for the USS
Theodore Roosevelt, based on the reported results [36].
TABLE I
PRIOR NODES AND STATES DEFINED BASED ON DATA COLLECTED.
Node States (proportions)
‘Hand Wash’ no (8.12%); yes (91.88%)
‘Hand Sanitizer’ no (6.81%); yes (93.19%)
‘Avoid Common Areas’ no (62.04%); yes (37.96%)
‘Face Cover’ no (25.92%); yes (74.08%)
‘Workspace Cleaning’ no (19.63%); yes (80.37%)
‘Berth Cleaning’ no (34.03%); yes (65.97%)
‘Keeping Distance’ no (49.74%); yes (50.26%)
‘Infection Rate’ 0 to 10 (Uniform Distribution)
‘Gender’ male (75.65%); female (24.35%)
‘Age’ 18-24 (29.58%); 25-29 (20.42%)30-39 (38.74%); 40-59 (11.26%)
In this paper, we introduce a measure called the Preventive
Index (PI) that illustrates the idea of how selected actions can
indirectly increase/decrease the chance of infection. PI for a
specific action is defined as follows:
PIi = 1 +
βi − αi
βi
(5)
where subscript i represents one of the prevention measures,
αi represents the probability of having COVID-19 given
that prevention action i is performed, and βi represents the
probability of having COVID-19 given no prevention measure
i implemented. In other words, it captures the degree of
influences of each preventive measure on the infection rate.
The probability values, α and beta, are calculated based on
the statistics from [36], and are summarized in Table II.
For example, it was reported that 283 volunteers used
face covers as a preventive measure, of which 158 reported
having COVID-19. In addition, it is known that a total of 238
volunteers were having COVID-19. Therefore, combining both
knowledges, we get 55.83% (158/283) and 80.81% (80/99)
of having COVID-19 for the subjects who used face cover
or not, respectively. Based on Equation (5), a PI of 1.3091
(1+(80.81−55.83)/80.81) is obtained for using a face cover.
This represents a “positive” PI, therefore, reducing the overall
probability of infection.
The CPT for ‘Prevention Index’ represents a distribu-
tion of the cumulative prevention index. It is calculated based
on the product of the individual preventive indices:
PIcumulative = PI0
N∏
i=1
γiPIi + (1− γi) (6)
where N is the number of prevention measures (7 in this
paper), γi is a binary value indicating whether the prevention
measure i is taken, PIi is the individual prevention index for
behavior/action i, and PI0 represents the default prevention
index for no preventive measure taken (it is assumed to be 1
in this paper).
For example, a base case where no preventive action is
used will result in a prevention index of 1. Based on Equa-
tion (6), if ‘Hand Wash’ is applied, the index is increased
to 1.0373 (1 × 1.0373). This can be further increased to
1.2014 (1×1.0373×1.1582) if ‘Hand Sanitizer’ is used
with ‘Hand Wash’. Note that a special case exists for the
‘Workspace Cleaning’ action as it reduces the index
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Fig. 3. Causal network for the case of the USS Theodore Roosevelt data. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order knowledge is represented in purple, green, and red,
respectively, while grey-color indicates inactive nodes. The background image source: Wikipedia
TABLE II
CHANCE OF HAVING COVID-19 GIVEN THE PREVENTION MEASURES.
Doing Not Doing Prevention
(α) (β) Index
‘Hand Wash’ 62.11 64.52 1.0373
‘Hand Sanitizer’ 61.52 73.08 1.1582
‘Avoid Common Areas’ 53.79 67.51 1.2032
‘Face Cover’ 55.83 80.81 1.3091
‘Workspace Cleaning’ 63.52 57.33 0.8921
‘Berth Cleaning’ 61.90 63.08 1.0186
‘Keeping Distance’ 54.69 70.00 1.2188
instead of increasing. Given this definition, the prevention
index ranges from 0.8921 (only ‘Workspace Cleaning’)
to 2.3492 (all actions except ‘Workspace Cleaning’)
depending on the number of preventive action taken.
Similarly, the computation of the CPTs for ‘Vulnerable’
(V) uses the normalized values of the product of the probabil-
ities for ‘Gender’ (G) and ‘Age’ (A):
V =
Ai ×Gj
(Ai ×Gj) + ((1−Ai)× (1−Gj)) (7)
where Ai represents the probability of having COVID-19 for
age category i (18-24, 25-29, 30-39, and 40-59), and Gi
represents the probability of having COVID-19 for gender
category j (male or female).
For example, given that the probability of having COVID-
19 for the age group 18-24 is 68.1% and the probability of
having COVID-19 for gender group male is 65.7%, the degree
of vulnerability is computed as follows (Equation (7)):
V =
0.681× 0.657
0.681× 0.657 + 0.319× 0.343 = 0.8035
As a sample, two CPT tables, for the Nodes “Symptoms”
and “Vulnerable” are shown in Tables III and IV, respectively.
TABLE III
CPT FOR SYMPTOMS
has COVID Symptoms0 1-3 4-5 6-8 >8
No 0.3750 0.3403 0.0903 0.1111 0.0833
Yes 0.1849 0.2143 0.1555 0.2101 0.2353
TABLE IV
CPT FOR VULNERABLE
Gender Age VulnerableNo Yes
Male
18-24 0.1965 0.8035
25-29 0.2262 0.7738
30-39 0.2678 0.7322
40-59 0.2926 0.7074
Female
18-24 0.3053 0.6947
25-29 0.3444 0.6556
30-39 0.3966 0.6034
40-59 0.4263 0.5737
The CPT for ‘Has COVID’ is estimated based on the re-
lationship of ‘Prevention Index’ (PI), ‘Vulnerable’
(V) and ‘Infection Rate’ (IR), specifically:
P (Has COVID) =
IR
PI
× (V+ 1) (8)
In Equation 8, the IR is reduced based on the PI and then
multiplied by the value V + 1. This serves as a multiplier
when calculating the chance of having COVID-19. The value
V = 0 (False) means that the person is not vulnerable.
In this paper, we assume V = 1 (True) when a subject is
vulnerable. Thus, the vulnerable subject’s chance of having
COVID-19 is multiplied by a factor of V + 1 = 2.
The remaining nodes ‘Symptoms’ and ‘Test’ have CPTs
created directly based on the data from [36]. For exam-
ple, the conditional probability for 0 symptoms is defined
as P (Symptoms = 0|COVID = Y es) = 11.52% and
P (Symptoms = 0|COVID = No) = 14.14%.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EMERGING TOPICS IN COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, VOL. , NO. 2020 6
The list of the COVID-19 symptoms reported in [36]
included loss of taste, smell, or both, palpitations, fever, chills,
myalgia, cough, nausea, fatigue, shortness of breath/difficult
breathing, chest pain, abdominal pain, runny nose, diarrhea,
headache, vomiting, and sore throat. Note that in this paper,
we are interested in the number of symptoms and not their
type.
One of our key interest in this paper is to evaluate the
risk of being infected with COVID-19. Equation (2) defines
risk as a function of impact and probability of the event of
interest. In this paper, we define two types of infection risk:
the risk of missing the true infection (positive risk, Riskp)
and the risk of declaring the infection when it is not the case
(negative risk, Riskn). A positive risk reflects the impact of
virus spreading undetected, while a negative risk is determined
by the false positive testing resulting in unnecessary treatment
or quarantine. These risk equations are defined as follows:
Riskp = Impactu × FNR + Impactk × TPR (9)
Riskn = Impactq × FPR + Impactc × TNR (10)
where Impactu represents the cost of undetected virus
spreading (very high), Impactk represents the cost of un-
necessary “precaution” such as quarantining (high), Impactq
represents cost of quarantine (low), Impactc represents the
base cost of testing (very low), True Positive Rate (TPR) is
defined as TPR = 1 − FNR, True Negative Rate (TNR) is
defined as TNR = 1 − FPR and FPR/FNR is defined by
Equation (3).
For example, given a specific scenario where the error rates
(FPR = 1% and FNR = 20%) and impact values (very high =
4, high = 3, low = 2, very low = 1) are given, the overall risk
is estimated as follows:
Riskp = 4× 0.20 + 3× 0.80 = 3.20
Riskn = 2× 0.01 + 1× 0.99 = 1.01
B. Experiments
Experiments on the BN shown in this section were imple-
mented using the open-source Python library pyAgrum [37].
The following scenarios were considered in our experi-
ments:
• Scenario 1: The effects of increasing the ‘Prevention
Index’ with a constant ‘Vulnerability’ and
‘Infection Rate’ on ‘Has COVID’;
• Scenario 2: The influence of ‘Symptoms’ on ‘Has
COVID’;
• Scenario 3: The impact of ‘Has COVID’ on
‘Vulnerable’; and
• Scenario 4: The predicted ‘Infection Rate’ given
‘Symptoms’ and ‘Prevention Index’
Scenario 1: Scenario 1 explores how different preventive
measures influence the chance for a subject to be infected
with COVID-19. Table V shows the probability of a subject
having COVID-19 given various ‘Prevention Index’ and
whether or not they are ‘Vulnerable’. As the prevention
index increases, the chance of getting COVID-19 decreases
regardless of vulnerability. For example, when (a) prevention
index 0.9 and 1.0, the chance of getting COVID-19 is reduced
from 82.23% to 79.41%, which represents about 2.82% dif-
ference in getting COVID-19 for a 0.1 increase in prevention
index. Table V (c) assumes a specific case where no evidence
for ‘Vulnerable’ is given.
Scenario 2: For scenario 2, we analyze the causal relation-
ship between the number of symptoms and the fact of having
COVID-19. Table VI shows the chance of having COVID-
19 given the number of symptoms. As the number of symp-
toms increases, the chance of the individual having COVID-
19 increases proportionally. For 0 symptoms (a subject is
asymptomatic), a chance of having COVID-19 is 29.67%. It
increases to 59.57% for the subjects having 4-5 symptoms.
Scenario 3: Scenario 3 considers how to infer the chance
of a subject being vulnerable given the evidence of having
COVID-19. Table VII illustrates this scenario for determining
the vulnerability of a person given their infection status. For
instance, when a person is diagnosed with COVID-19, he/she
very likely belongs to the group of vulnerable.
Scenario 4: Scenario 4 estimates the infection rate given
various evidence for both the number of symptoms and
preventive behaviors. Table VIII shows the estimated average
‘Infection Rate’ for fixed prevention index of 0.9 (a), 1.5
(b), and 2.3 (c). We observed, quite surprisingly, that the in-
fection rate is minimally impacted by the prevention index. In
part, this is because we assumed that ‘Prevention Index’
and ‘Infection Rate’ are independent. The number of
symptoms, on the other side, has a direct influence on the
estimated infection rate.
Assuming the specific scenario of USS Theodore Roosevelt
with the estimated error rates are estimated assuming that
RT-PCR test results are ground truth and ELISA test results
are predicted cases. Based on this assumption, FPR and FNR
are calculated to be = 10.88% (16/147) and 9.79% (23/235),
respectively. With the given impact values (very high = 4, high
= 3, low = 2, very low = 1), the overall risk is computed as
follows:
Riskp = 4× 0.0979 + 3× 0.9021 = 3.0979
Riskn = 2× 0.1088 + 1× 0.8912 = 1.1088
The maximum value of positive risk is 4 (FNR=100%) and the
minimum value is 3 (FNR=0%). These two cases represent the
extreme cases where either all infected subjects are correctly
diagnosed or all of them are misdiagnosed. Similarly, the
maximum value of negative risk is 2 (FPR=100%) and the
minimum value is 1 (FPR=0%). The two cases represent the
extreme cases where either all healthy subjects are misdiag-
nosed or cleared.
In this section, we illustrate the idea of how a decision-
maker such as a medical officer and/or a captain, can use
the proposed causal network to infer the risks in relation
to the actions/decisions. Specifically, we show that inaction
(no prevention behavior, Preventive Index = 1) and
infection rate of 70% results in 71.71% of the crew be-
ing infected. If all beneficial prevention behavior is taken
(Preventive Index = 2.3), the chance for the crew to
be infected is reduced to 48.92%.
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TABLE V
SCENARIO 1: EFFECTS OF ‘PREVENTION INDEX’ ON ‘HAS COVID’ WITH INFECTION RATE = 70%
(a) Vulnerable = Y es (b) Vulnerable = No (c) Vulnerable =?
Prevention
P (Has COVID = Yes)Index
0.9 82.23
1.0 79.41
1.5 67.78
2.0 59.12
2.3 54.94
No Evidence 67.09
Prevention
P (Has COVID = Yes)Index
0.9 49.09
1.0 47.09
1.5 39.13
2.0 33.47
2.3 30.79
No Evidence 38.67
Prevention
P (Has COVID = Yes)Index
0.9 74.38
1.0 71.71
1.5 60.81
2.0 52.79
2.3 48.92
No Evidence 60.17
TABLE VI
SCENARIO 2: INFLUENCES OF ‘SYMPTOMS’ ON ‘HAS COVID’
Symptoms P (Has COVID)
0 29.67
1-3 35.02
4-5 59.57
6-8 61.80
>8 70.73
No Evidence 46.11
TABLE VII
SCENARIO 3: IMPACTS OF ‘HAS COVID’ ON ‘VULNERABLE’
Has COVID P (Vulnerable = Yes)
Yes 84.36
No 67.04
No Evidence 75.03
C. Limitations
Given the proposed causal model, there are several limita-
tion/assumptions including:
• Insufficient amount of data to capture the true causal
relationship,
• The CPT of the BN nodes are populated based on sim-
plified equations and approximations/assumptions, and
• There is also an assumption that each prevention measure
is independent, while in reality they might be related.
As indicated earlier, some causal relationships are inferred
based on the data. Therefore, in case of insufficient data, some
relationships can be misleading and/or missing. For example,
data regarding spatial location and congestion of the crew is
currently missing. Selected subjects may be required to travel
through the ship to the targeted areas due to their duty, and
this required movement may result in an increased chance of
infection.
As well, the nodes such as ‘has COVID’, ‘Vulnerable’,
and ‘Prevention Index’, are populated based on the
proposed equations. These equations only illustrate the gen-
eral, not necessarily the exact relationship, and were derived
for the given scenario, and may require modification when
transferred to another study. For example, age, gender, and
preventive behaviors can greatly increase or decrease the
chance of infection, but this relationship cannot be captured
by deterministic equations.
In this study, we assume that the seven preventive behaviors
reported by the volunteers in [36] are independent. This
assumption is not sufficient, as subjects can generally be clas-
sified as risk-averse or risk-tolerant. Risk-averse individuals
are much more likely to take preventive measures, that is, the
subject that uses face masks are also the ones who keep a
social distance.
In addition, the bias in the sampling of data can severely
impact the causal network model, specifically the creation of
the CPTs. In the USS Theodore Roosevelt case, there is a sig-
nificant bias regarding the crew composition of younger males.
Based on the collected data [36], age group 18-24 contains the
most members but also contributes to the largest percentage
of having COVID-19 (68.1%), whereas the age group 40-59
contains the least amount of infected (55.8%). This contradicts
the belief that older people are more vulnerable. Possible
reasons for this contradiction may be that younger people
are prone to more interactions, while older people take more
precautionary measures, as well as they are are more likely
to be of higher rank on the ship and have different duties
requiring less contact. Lastly, all the data collected in [36]
were collected on a volunteer basis, and, therefore, represent
only a fraction of the ship population.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper contributes to bridging the technology gap (Fig-
ure 1) that exists between the contemporary ES models and
human expert’s limitations to handle uncertainty provided by
the model while striving to make reliable decisions. It asserts
that the solution lies in deploying the causal networks that
capture an approximation of joint probabilistic distributions
of epidemiological factors.
We propose a general DSS model with an embedded
reasoning mechanism using a causal Bayesian network. This
reasoning results in the probabilities and risk assessment of
the outcomes of interest, thus providing recommendations to
the human decision-makers.
The DSS ability to support human experts with or with-
out technical background should be estimated using various
measures, including the generally used “technological” per-
formance measures. The recent emergence of “precaution”
measures such as risk, trust, and bias address this trend. In
this paper, we focus on risk assessment. It should be noted
that
Other open applied problems to be further addressed in-
clude studies of other precautionary measures such as bias and
trust. These shall reflect various decision-making dimensions:
− Technical, e.g. prediction accuracy and throughput [13],
− Social, e.g. trust in CI [30], [38],
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TABLE VIII
SCENARIO 4: ESTIMATED ‘INFECTION RATE’ GIVEN ‘SYMPTOMS’ AND ‘PREVENTION INDEX’
(a) Prevention Index = 0.9 (b) Prevention Index = 1.5 (c) Prevention Index = 2.3
Symptoms Average
Infection Rate (%)
0 48.45
1-3 50.31
4-5 57.72
6-8 58.31
>8 60.57
No Evidence 53.46
Symptoms Average
Infection Rate (%)
0 48.84
1-3 50.24
4-5 56.63
6-8 57.20
>8 59.51
No Evidence 52.78
Symptoms Average
Infection Rate (%)
0 49.13
1-3 50.18
4-5 55.54
6-8 56.08
>8 58.23
No Evidence 52.20
− Psychological, e.g., efficiency of human-machine interac-
tions [39]–[41], and
− Privacy and security domain, e.g., vulnerability of per-
sonal data [42]–[44].
Finally, in the context of epidemic or pandemic prepared-
ness, the human decision makes may need support as the
situation develops (proactive reasoning). Given data from
the epidemiological model, the output of such DSS is a
result of dynamic evidential reasoning. This approach shall be
further developed for better managing future epidemics and
pandemics.
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